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In 2007, Mr. Joseph Jones, Mr. Desmond Thurston, and Mr. Antwuan Ball

exercised their Sixth Amendment right to require the government prove to a Washington,
D.C. jury that they were guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of multiple offenses arising
from their alleged involvement with a crack-dealing gang. 1 The three defendants were
charged with conspiracy to distribute crack, distribution of crack (multiple counts), and
various violent crime and racketeering offenses.2 At trial, the government's proof included
recordings of the defendants selling crack, testimony from former defendants turned
cooperators, and testimony from witnesses who had purchased crack from the three
defendants.3 On November 28, 2007, the jury convicted the three men of the distribution
charges, but acquitted them of the conspiracy, racketeering, and violent crime charges.4
Despite the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, the sentencing judge leveraged
the distribution convictions to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendants' "crimes were part of a common scheme to distribute crack." 5 The judge then
determined, again using the preponderance standard, that the scheme involved sales of
over 500 grams of crack for Mr. Jones, and 1.5 kilograms of crack for the other two
defendants.6 Based on these findings, the judge increased the three defendants' sentencing
exposure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from between 27 and 71 months
imprisonment, to 324 to 405 months for Mr. Jones, 262 to 327 months for Mr. Thurston,

and 292 to 365 months for Mr. Ball. The judge varied below the enhanced ranges to
impose prison sentences of 180 months for Mr. Jones, 194 months for Mr. Thurston, and
225 months for Mr. Ball.8

The three defendants appealed their sentences on the basis that "their sentences
violated their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because they were based, in part, on
[their] supposed involvement in the very conspiracy that the jury acquitted them of
participating in." 9 While the D.C. Circuit "underst[oo]d why appellants find sentencing on
acquitted conduct unfair," the law allowed it, so the appellate court found no fault with
sentences the three defendants received.10
This outcome shocks the conscience of the average layperson whose knowledge
of the criminal justice system likely begins and ends with "innocent until proven guilty."
That is because what allowed this outcome is a dirty secret of the criminal justice system:
United States v.

Watts. Watts allows judges to sentence multi-count defendants for

conduct underlying acquitted counts." It is an allocation of judicial power that (for most)
provokes visceral protestation. Yet, it is a practice that has continued largely unabated
before and after the Supreme Court blessed it in Watts over 17 years ago.
Many commentators and scholars have written how acquitted conduct sentencing
violates the intent and spirit of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This article takes this

' United Statesv. Jones, 744 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014). Only Mr.
Jones and Mr. Ball were charged with the violent crimes. See id at 1365 nl.
2Id.
at 1365 & n.1.
SId. at 1365.
4
Id. at 1365 & n.1.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1365-66.
7id.

8Id.
9

Id. at 1368.
1369; The Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari. Jones v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 8 (2014). The denial, and Justice Scalia's dissent, is discussed later in this article.
" 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997).

1 Id. at
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common analysis one step further, by arguing that a quartet of Supreme Court Sixth
Amendment cases are a Constitutional bar to acquitted conduct sentencing. With Apprendi
v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington 3 , United States v. Booker 4 , and more recently,

Alleyne v. United States", the Supreme Court reinforced, clarified, and extended the line
in the sand that separates the power and reach of the bench from the province of the jury.
Taken together, this "max-min quartet" firmly establishes that a judge's sentencing power
begins and ends with the jury and the reasonable doubt standard. 1 6 More importantly, they
provide the means to force the Sixth Amendment confrontation that the Supreme Court
deftly avoided in Watts -- a confrontation that Watts cannot survive.
SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND THE BIRTH OF THE GUIDELINES
Before examining Watts and the max-min quartet, it is important to understand

the judicial context and environment that allowed Watts and acquitted conduct sentencing
to emerge and survive, despite contradicting bedrock principles of the American criminal
justice system.
For nearly a century prior to 1984, the federal system employed an indeterminate
sentencing model that approached crime as a moral disease to be cured through
rehabilitation.17 Indeed, the model "was premised on a faith in rehabilitation." 8 Judges,
supported by parole officers, were viewed as experts of the disease, and were therefore
vested with broad discretion to fashion sentences that provided sufficient time to cure
defendants through rehabilitation. 1
During this time, judicial sentencing authority and practice were largely
unregulated and unchecked. The majority of federal criminal statutes had open-ended
punishment ranges or merely set the maximum numbers of years a defendant could be
sentenced to prison.2 0 Judges had unquestioned discretion to sentence a defendant
anywhere within the statutory limits. 2 1 Appellate courts took a hands-off approach and
interjected themselves only when a sentence exceeded the statutory limits or reflected a
gross abuse of discretion.22 This unfettered respect for judicial discretion extended even to

13

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
542 U.S. 296 (2004), reh g denied, 542 U.S. 961 (2004).

14

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

12

133 S. Ct. 2152 (2013).
See cases cited supra notes 12-15.
" See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1989) ("For almost a century, the Federal Government
employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing."); see also Tapia v. United States, 13 1 S. Ct.
2382, 2383, 2386 (2011) (citing and quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Is
Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1186 (1993).
" Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363 ("Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were
based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed probable rehabilitation. . . .").
19 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-64. Tapia, 131 U.S. at 2386 ("If the judge decided to impose a prison term,
discretionary authority shifted to parole officials: Once the defendant had a spent a third of his term behind bars,
they could order his release.").
20 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencingReform: The Legislative History ofthe Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 225 (1993).
21 Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("It is clear beyond peradventure that this court
had and has no control over a sentence which comports with the applicable statute, 'even though it be a death
sentence.' Nor may we reduce or modify a sentence nor require a trial judge to do so.") (quoting Rosenberg v.
United States, 344 U.S. 889, 890 (1952)); United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519, 521 (D.D.C. 1971) ("It is
clear that absent a manifest abuse of discretion, and provided the trial judge complies with the applicable statute,
his discretion in sentencing cannot be infringed upon."); Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 225.
22 Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 226, 245; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
1
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death sentences. 2 3 A judge's sentence, for the most part, was final and absolute. 2 4 It was
only with the introduction of federal parole in 1910, did Congress reduce (somewhat)
25
judicial sentencing power.
By the 1970s, "this model of indeterminate sentencing eventually fell into
disfavor."26 The model, and unchecked judicial sentencing discretion, came under
increasing criticism from academics and legislators from both the political left and right.27
To the conservative right, judges were using their unchecked discretion to impose lenient,
disparate, and inconsistent sentences that allowed dangerous, repeat offenders to escape
sufficient terms of imprisonment.28 For the liberal left, the problem was a growing
disparity in the sentences handed to minorities compared to the lighter sentences white
defendants received for comparable crimes. 2 9
After a decade of many fits and starts (and failures) to revamp sentencing policy,
the contrasting concerns of the political left and right converged with the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (hereinafter the "SRA"). 30 The SRA was a near complete
overhaul of federal sentencing policy and practice. 31 Most notably, the SRA was the
abandonment of the indeterminate model in favor of a determinate model that Congress
believed would yield consistent and proportionate sentences, and ease the public's
confusion and concern about sentencing lengths.32 To be the engine of this new model, the
SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter the "Commission"),
See, e.g., Rosenberg, 344 U.S. at 889-90 (1952) ("A sentence imposed by a United States district court, even
though it be a death sentence, is not within the power of the Court to revise.") (discussing congressional action in
1911 abolishing the right to an appeal).
24 Lowery, 335 F. Supp. at 521 ("Initially, it cannot be gainsaid that
in matters relating to sentencing the trial
court has virtually absolute, if not unfettered discretion.").
25 Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 226-27 ("[P]arole authorities were assigned the task of detenninng the actual
release date for most federal prisoners . . . With the advent of federal parole, federal prison sentences became
partially indeterminate.") (explaining that parole reduced judicial sentencing power).
26 Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011); see also Gerald Leonard & Christine Dieter, Punishment
23

Without Conviction: Controllingthe Use of Unconvicted Conduct in FederalSentencing, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM.

L. 260, 271 (2012).
27 See Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 41 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) ("The
absence of a comprehensive federal sentencing law and of statutory guidance on how to select the appropriate
sentencing option creates inevitable disparity in the sentences which courts impose on similarly situated
defendants."); See also Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 228. Perhaps the most influential critic was Marvin
Frankel, a well-respected former federal judge and former Columbia law school professor. Id. In 1972, while
serving on the bench, Judge Frankel published Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, which zealously
criticized judicial "wholly unchecked and sweeping" sentencing authority and called for the creation of a
"Commission on Sentencing" responsible for establishing "binding" sentencing guides. Id. Judge Frankel's
views and his book would serve as the model and inspiration for the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Id.
28 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 44-45; see Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271; see Frank 0. Bowman, III,
Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has MangledAmerican Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77

U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 374 (2010).
29 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 65; see also Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2387; see Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271.
30 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 65 ("The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing
criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for reform."); see also Tapia, 131 S.Ct. at 2387.
See Stith & Koh, supra note 20, for a discussion of the comprehensive legislative history of the SRA.
31 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1991) ("The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revolutionized the
manner in which district courts sentence persons convicted of federal crimes."); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
65, ("[The SRA] meets the critical challenge of sentencing reform. The bill's sweeping provisions are designed
to structure judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole release, and make
criminal sentencing fairer and more certain.").
32 See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1474-75 (2012); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?,40
UCLA L. REv. 1179, 1190 (1993); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.3 (2013) [hereinafter
"U.S.S.G."]. In passing the SRA, Congress sought "honesty in sentencing", "to avoid the confusion and implicit
deception" of indeterminate sentencing, and "reasonable uniformity." Id. [Note: The sentencing guidelines are
referred throughout this Article as the "Guidelines"].
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and charged it with crafting the federal sentencing guidelines
"Guidelines"). 3 3

(hereinafter the

The SRA also shifted the focus of sentencing from rehabilitation to punishment
and deterrence.3 4 More bluntly, the SRA was the legislative rejection of the premise that
prison was for rehabilitation.3 5 Indeed, Congress made its rejection clear by limiting
judicial discretion to the sentencing factors specified by Congress, of which rehabilitation
is one of many, and one that is not highly valued.3 6
MODIFIED REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES

It took the Commission nearly three years to draft the Guidelines and for
Congress to approve them. At the start, the Commission's critical decision was whether to
base the Guidelines on the charged offense or the "real" offense.37 In a "charge offense"
system, a defendant is sentenced solely on the offense of conviction (and his criminal
record) without considering the particulars of the defendant's criminal conduct. 38 Charge
offense sentencing restrains judicial discretion and promotes sentencing consistency, but
at the expense of particularized sentencing, which recognizes that criminal offenses are
committed with varying degrees of culpability and that not all defendants are the same.
In contrast, under a "real offense" system, a defendant's sentence is based on the
particulars and specifics of his criminal conduct, the context of the conduct, and who was
involved with or injured by the conduct. 39 The advantage of real offense sentencing is that
it allows a judge to tailor a sentence specifically to the circumstances that aggravate or
mitigate a particular criminal act. The downside is that real offense sentencing fosters
sentencing disparity -- a defendant's sentence is largely determined by which judge the
defendant draws and how the judge subjectively views the defendant and the defendant's
conduct.
The Commission initially pursued a real offense system. 4 0 However, this effort
"proved unproductive" as the Commission failed to find a "practical way to combine and
account for the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances." 4 1 The
33

.

Mistretta,488 U.S. at 367-68 (1989); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2387; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 63 ("[The
SRA] creates a United States Sentencing Commission whose duty is to promulgate sentencing guidelines and
policy
statements."); Lear, supra note 32, at 1190.
34
Mistretta,488 U.S. at 367 ("[The SRA] rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation. .. and it
states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals.") (citation
omitted); see also Lear, supra note 32, at 1190-91.
35
See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2010); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 40 ("The
sentencing provisions of current law were originally based on a rehabilitation model . . .. Recent studies suggest
that this approach has failed, and most sentencing judges as well as the parole commission agree that the
rehabilitation model is not an appropriate bases for sentencing.").
3 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582) ("[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."); see generally Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (holding that the SRA precluded a sentencing court from
lengthening a defendant's prison term to promote rehabilitation); but see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (West
2010) ("[T]o provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.").
3 See U.S.S.G., supra note 32, § 1AL.4(a) ("One of the most important questions for the Commission to decide
was whether to base sentences upon the actual conduct . . . or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of
the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted . .
38
d
39
d
40 id.
41 id
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Commission was also unable to devise a simple and efficient system that would not result
in the sentencing disparities the SRA was enacted to prevent.4 2
The Commission eventually settled on a modified real offense system that
incorporates elements of charge offense sentencing.43 This hybrid system is employed
today. It consists of base offense levels for every federal offense and pre-set offense level
increases (and a few decreases) based on contextual factors. The base offense level with
the adjustments produce a final offense level that ranges from one to forty-three.44
Separately, to account for the varying criminal records of defendants, the Commission
established a point-based system for measuring a defendant's criminal record and status at
the time of the instant conviction.4 5 A defendant's total number of criminal history points
determines into which of the six criminal history categories he falls. 46 Using the
Guidelines' sentencing table, the intersection point of a defendant's the final offense level
and his criminal history category yield his presumptive sentencing range. 47
RELEVANT CONDUCT

A central tenet of real offense sentencing is that sentencing judges are free to set
a term of imprisonment, within the statutory maximum, based on the specific conduct of
the defendant and all that resulted from the conduct. In real offense sentencing a judge is
not limited by the elements of the offense of conviction. The "modified" approach of the
Guidelines incorporates this tenet by allowing judges to sentence a defendant based on
"relevant conduct." 48 Relevant conduct extends outside and beyond the elements of the
offense of conviction, as well as the offense itself. 4 9 Relevant conduct can consist of facts
related to the criminal conduct underlying the conviction, uncharged conduct, dismissed
charges, the conduct of others done "in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity," or (the focus of this Article) acquitted conduct.50
To encapsulate "relevant conduct" the Guidelines enumerate a number of
"specific offense characteristics" and "applicable general adjustments" consisting of
particular mitigating or aggravating circumstances that increase (or at times decrease) a
defendant's offense level by a prescribed number of levels. 5 1 The number of adjustments

42

id.

Lear, supra note 32, at 1194; Leonard and Dieter, supra note 26, at 273; The Commission characterization of
the system as a charge offense system that "contains a significant number of real offense elements," U.S.S.G.,
43

supra note 37, §lA.4(a), is belied by the real offense adjustments and considerations that are built into or

accompany nearly every factor for determining a defendant's sentencing range, from his base offense level, see,
e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 37, §4A1.1(d) (requiring the addition of two criminal history points if the defendant

committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence such as probation or parole). On its face
and in practice, the Guidelines are a real offense system that has elements of a charge offense system.
44
45 See generally U.S.S.G., supra note 37, §1B1.1(a); see also id. §2A1.1(a).
1d. § 1B1.(a).
46

id

47id

48

§ 1B1.3.
Id; see also id. § 5K2.21 (allowing a court to "depart upward" for dismissed or uncharged conduct).
5o Id. § 1B 1.3(a)(1). However, the Guidelines do not explicitly provide that acquitted conduct is "relevant
conduct." Indeed, the Guidelines provide only a bland and passive endorsement of acquitted conduct sentencing.
See id. § 6A.3 cmt. background ("In determining relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to
information that would be admissible at trial.") (citing Watts in support of the Guidelines' sentencing policy).
" Id § lB 1.3. The number of enumerated offense adjustments is fixed, and in some ways limited. For the
Commission to account for the nearly unlimited variations and variables of conduct and harm would have
rendered the Guidelines too complex, dense, and unworkable. See id. § 1A.4(a) ("[N]o practical way to
combine and account for the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances; nor did [the
Commission] find a practical way to reconcile the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure with the need for a
1 d

49
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is fixed, and in some ways limited, because to account for "every conceivable wrinkle of
each case would quickly become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of
punishment and its deterrent effect." 5 2 However, for egregious conduct that falls through
the cracks, the Guidelines encourage judges to increase a defendant's offense level or
sentence a defendant above his presumed guideline range. 53
Relevant conduct sentencing under the Guidelines mirrors the statutory directive
from Congress that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a [court]
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 54
Relevant conduct sentencing, therefore, is essentially without boundaries or limits. One
such absent border is the reasonable doubt standard. The preponderance of evidence
standard reigns for sentencing. 5 It is a standard that is free from the purposefully
burdensome constraints and obligations of the reasonable doubt standard, in favor of a
standard where a splinter over 50% exposes a defendant to an enhanced sentence.5 6 Once
the door of conviction is opened, a defendant is left to answer for his entire life up to that
moment, regardless of how tenuous the link to the offense of conviction, and regardless
that the proof would fail to convince ajury.
UNITED STATES V. WATT

In two cases decided together in 1997 as United States v. Watts,5 7 the Supreme
Court established that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct otherwise proven
under the preponderance standard at sentencing to determine a defendant's sentence. 58
In Watts, police found cocaine base and two loaded firearms in separate parts of
Watts's home. 59 At trial, Watts was convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute
cocaine base, but acquitted of the using a firearm in relation to the drug offense.60 In the
companion case, Putra was captured on videotape selling cocaine to a government
informant on two separate occasions (May 8, 1992 and May 9, 1992). The jury convicted
speedy sentencing process given the potential existence of hosts of adjudicated 'real hann' facts in many typical

cases.").
52Id. §lA.3.
See, e.g., id. §§ 5K2.0-5K2.17.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (West 2014) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 37, § 1B 1.4 (adopting §
3661). It is important to note that § 3661's broad unrestricted scope is not fully embraced by the Guidelines. In
contrast to § 3661, the Guidelines discourage or limit a judge from considering a defendant's education,
vocational skills, drug or alcohol dependence, gambling addiction, employment record, family ties, race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, disadvantaged upbringing in determining a sentence or
decreasing a defendant's offense level. See Id. § 1B1.4 cmt. background; Id. §§ 5H1.2-5H1.6, 5H1.10, 5H1.12.
See McMillanv. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that using the preponderance standard to
find sentencing factors that enhance a sentence within the statutory maximum is consistent with due process); see
also U.S.S.G., supra note 37, § 6A1.3 cmt. background ("The Commission believes that use of a preponderance
of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving
disputes regarding the application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.").
* See, United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 & n.2 (1997).
* Watts consisted of two cases from the Ninth Circuit: United States v. Watts and UnitedStates v. Putra. Watts
consisted of two cases from the Ninth Circuit: UnitedStates v. Watts and United States v. Putra. Id. at 149.
" In Williams v. New York, the Supreme Court opened the door to acquitted conduct sentencing by affirming a
trial judge's imposition of the death sentence after the jury recommended a life sentence for the defendant's first
degree murder charge. 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949). The Supreme Court held that it is consistent with due process
and proper under New York law, for the trial judge to rely on additional information obtained by the probation
department, but not presented to the jury, to impose a harsher punishment than had been recommended by the
jury. Id. at 242-43.
5
W~atts, 529 U.S. at 149.
6
oId at 149-50.
5

54
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her of the distribution count for the May 8 th transaction, but acquitted her for the May 9 th
transaction. 6 1 During the sentencing phase in both cases, the district court found that Watts
and Putra had engaged in the conduct underlying the acquitted offenses, and used this
"relevant conduct" to increase their respective final offense levels under the Guidelines. 6 2
For Watts, the adjustment consisted of a two-level bump for possession of a gun in
connection with a drug offense.6 3 For Putra, the court aggregated the amount of drugs
from the May 8 th and May 9 th transactions to determine her offense level. 6 4 In both cases,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing, on the ground that
it was improper to punish the defendants for facts and offenses that the jury rejected with
their acquittals. 65
The Ninth Circuit's decisions created a circuit split.6 6 In response, the Supreme
Court took up Watts and Putra. The Court resolved the split by reversing and remanding
both Ninth Circuit decisions by way of a short per curiam opinion that was issued without
full briefing or oral argument. 67
The Supreme Court's starting point was the "longstanding principle" codified by

§ 3661 and pre-dating the Guidelines, that "sentencing courts have broad discretion to
consider various kinds of information," including conduct that may not have resulted in a
conviction.68 The Court noted that the Guidelines expressly adopted and incorporated this
69
principle. In the Court's view, this "longstanding principle" plus the Guidelines' broad
embrace of "relevant conduct," created an expansive pool of sentencing conduct that
includes acquitted conduct.70
Next, with a quick stroke of the pen, the Court dismissed any thought that
acquitted conduct sentencing runs afoul of double jeopardy protections. The Court
explained that it is "erroneous" to confuse punishing a defendant for a crime for which he
was acquitted, with sentencing enhancements that increase a term of imprisonment
because of the manner in which defendant committed the crime.7 1 According to the Court,
sentencing based on acquitted conduct is the latter, and therefore does not implicate
double jeopardy.7 2
The Court ended its short opinion by clarifying what an acquittal means.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view in Watts and Putra, the Court explained that a "not
guilty" verdict is not a rejection of any facts or a finding that the defendant is actually

"'Id
62

Id. at 150-51.
Id at 150 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1. 1(b)(1) for triggering the bump).
64
Id. at 150-51.
65 Id

66 Id at 149 ("Every other Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may [consider acquitted conduct], if
the Government establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.").
6' Id. at 170-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For these reasons the case should have been set for full briefing and
consideration on the oral argument calendar. From the Court's failure to do so, I dissent.").
6' Id at 151 (majority opinion).
69
Id. at 152-53 (citing and discussing U.S.S.G. §1B1.3 and 1B1.4).
70
Id. at 151-53.
' Id. at 154. In making the point, the Court relied solely on Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). In Witte,
the defendant pled guilty to a marijuana distribution charge, but was sentenced based on a guideline range that
was calculated by including uncharged conduct involving cocaine importation. Id at 389. The defendant was
later indicted for the cocaine importation conduct. The Supreme Court held that the later indictment was not
barred by double jeopardy because the sentencing court's use of the uncharged cocaine conduct in increased
sentence for the marijuana charge did not constitute "punishment" for the cocaine conduct. Id
72 Watts, 519 U.S. at 154.
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innocent. 7 3 To the Court, a "not guilty" verdict is narrow, specific, and "merely proves the
existence of a reasonable doubt as to [a defendant's] guilt" because the government failed
to prove at least one essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 4
Therefore, to the Court, an acquittal provides no barriers to the government "relitigating
an issue when presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof."7 5
Justices Stevens and Kennedy issued separate dissents. Justice Kennedy took
issue with the Court's decision to render an opinion without full briefing and oral
argument. 7 6 Justice Stevens' criticism was more substantive and critical.7 7 Justice Stevens
methodically dismantled the majority's legal reasoning to show why neither the Court's
"prior cases nor the text of [§ 3661] warrants this perverse result."7 " And he ended his
dissent with a strong rebuke of what he saw as the majority's betrayal of the principles of
constitutional criminal jurisprudence.
THE COSTS OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING

Any discussion about the costs of acquitted conduct sentencing must start with
the depreciation of the jury's primacy in our criminal justice system. The right to a jury
trial is "fundamental to our system of justice" 0 whose importance is "hard to
overemphasize."s' Indeed, it is a civil right that the Founding Fathers agreed was
absolutely necessary even though they disagreed about the size and role of the federal
government.8 2 Acquitted conduct sentencing undermines and devalues the role of the jury,
and mocks the jury's historical roots and prominence by "trivializ[ing] 'legal guilt' or
'legal innocence' - which is what a jury decides."8 3 Indeed, the practice "severs the
connection between verdict and sentence," "thwarts the express will of the jury," and
jeopardizes the jury's power to serve as the bulwark between the accused and the
government.

84

The next conspicuous cost is that acquitted conduct provides prosecutors with a
second-bite at the apple of punishment under circumstances that substantially disfavor the
defendant. 5 The forum of sentencing advantages the government - one fact-finder (judge)

73

Id. at 155.
Id (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fireanns, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)).
Id at 156 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 343 (1990)).
Id. at 170 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 164.
7 Id at 169-70 ("The notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give
rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to that jurisprudence.").
8o Duncanv. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
8United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
82 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is
any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter
represent it as the very palladium of free government."); See also Apprendiv. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T] he jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the
Bill of Rights.").
83 United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2005).
84 United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 662-64 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("Stated differently, the jury is essentially ignored
when it disagrees with the prosecution."), overruled in partby United States v. Kaminski, 501 F.3d 655, 657 (6th
Cir. 2007). This outcome is not only "nonsensical" but violates the letter and spirit of our country's criminal
jurisprudence. Id.
8See
Barry L. Johnson, Ifat FirstYou Don'tSucceed Abolishing the Use ofAcquitted Conduct in Guidelines
Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REv. 153, 182-83 (1996); see also Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 672; see also United
74

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015

9

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 6
198

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

as opposed to multiple fact-finders who must be unanimous to convict (jury), a lower
standard of proof, looser evidentiary rules, and a finding that the defendant is already
guilty of something.8 6 It is against this backdrop that acquitted conduct sentencing allows
prosecutors to present the same evidence rejected by the jury (or even was deemed
inadmissible at trial) to establish that a defendant deserves an enhanced prison sentence
for conduct the jury did not find supported a guilty verdict. In effect, after failing before a
jury, the prosecution is allowed a "mini-trial" to re-ligate the issue under more favorable
circumstances. 7 And "[w]ith this second chance at success, the Government almost
always wins."
A related cost is that acquitted conduct sentencing empowers and emboldens
prosecutors to charge additional offenses with the intent of establishing "guilt" at
sentencing (under more favorable conditions) rather than at trial. In other words: charge
inflation. Take for instance a prosecutor who believes (or rather desires) that five charges
could apply to a defendant's conduct, but recognizes that only two charges can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In this scenario, acquitted conduct sentencing encourages the
prosecutor to pursue all five charges because only one conviction is needed to open the
door at sentencing to any of the charges rejected by the jury." In addition to the costs in
prison years, charge inflation contributes to pleas through cost-benefit coercion. A
defendant facing multiple charges not only has to weigh whether she can emerge
successful at trial, but also the added penalty exposure posed by charges she can beat
under the reasonable doubt standard, but may lose under the preponderance standard at
sentencing. More often than not, the result of this calculation is that the potential years of
imprisonment after trial, even if the defendant is able beat some of the charges, far
outweighs the plea offer provided by the government.
Finally, another cost are the potential sentencing disparities that the Guidelines
are designed to prevent. Not all judges engage in acquitted conduct sentencing, and the
judges that do engage in the practice, do not do so in a uniform manner. Disparities are a
inescapable consequence of defendants who appear before judges who reject acquitted
conduct sentencing and those who embrace it in varying degrees.
MAX-MIN QUARTET

As the central thesis of this Article is based on the "max-min quartet" of
Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, andAlleyne, a brief overview of the four cases is warranted.
90
Apprendi v. New Jersey

Apprendi was arrested for firing several shots into the home of a black family
who recently moved into an all-white neighborhood. During post-arrest questioning,
Apprendi stated that he fired into the house because the occupants were "black in color"
States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring) ("Government gets the proverbial
,second bite at the apple' during sentencing to essentially retry those counts on which it lost.").
86 Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 672 ("[C]onsideration of acquitted conduct skews the criminal justice system's
power differential much in the prosecution's favor.").
Id. at 672-73.

Canania, 532 F.3d at 776.
United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[Relevant conduct sentencing] obviously
invite[s] the prosecutor to indict for less serious offenses which are easy to prove and then expand them in the
probation office.") (quoting United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1332 (6th Cir. 1990)) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
90 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
89

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/6

10

Outlaw: Giving an Acquittal Its Due: Why a Quartet of Sixth Amendment Cas
2015]

GIVING AN ACQUITTAL ITS DUE

199

and he did not "want them in the neighborhood."" He was subsequently charged by a
New Jersey grand jury with 23 counts for the shootings and unlawful weapon
possession. 92 None of the charged counts referred to New Jersey's hate crime statute.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Apprendi pleaded guilty to two counts of seconddegree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and one count of possession of an
antipersonnel bomb. New Jersey law set a penalty range of five to ten years for the firearm
possession counts, and three to five years for the antipersonnel bomb count. 93 Under the
plea agreement, the state reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence under New
Jersey's hate crime statute, while Apprendi reserved the right to claim that a hate crime
enhancement violated the Constitution.9 4
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion in support of the
hate crime enhancement. The judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
enhancement was warranted.9 5 Apprendi was sentenced to 12 years for one of the firearm
possession counts (or two years over the ten-year maximum), and to shorter concurrent
sentences for the remaining two counts.9 6
Apprendi appealed arguing that for the hate crime enhancement to apply, the
Constitution's due process clause required the government to prove the bias motive to a
jury guided by the reasonable doubt standard. The state appellate court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected Apprendi's argument. Both courts of review relied heavily on
McMillan v. Pennsylvania to find that the hate crime enhancement was a sentencing

factor, rather than an element or separate offense requiring the reasonable doubt
standard. 9
The Supreme Court, however, sided with Apprendi. The Court held that New
Jersey's hate crime statute violated due process because it allowed a judge to increase a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the preponderance of the evidence. 9 " In
reaching this decision, the Court started with the premise that "taken together" the Sixth
Amendment's trial rights and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights
"indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. '"9
The Court then explored the "historic link between verdict and judgment and the
consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal
penalties."100 For years since the nation's founding, according to the Court, "[a]ny
possible distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was
unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court ...
"o1 The Court acknowledged that trial practices can "change in the course of centuries
91
92

Id. at 469 (noting that Apprendi later retracted the statement).
id

9

Id. at 469-470.

94 See id. at 468-69. New Jersey's hate crime statute provided for an "extended term" of imprisonment if the trial

judge found under the preponderance standard that a defendant committed the crime to intimidate a person or
group because of the person's or group's race, color, gender, or other protected classes. Id.
95
Id. at 470-71.
96
Id. at 471.
97 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding that using the preponderance standard to find sentencing factors that enhance
a sentence within the statutory maximum is consistent with due process).
98
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92, 497.
99
Id at 476-77 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
.00 Id. at 482.
1o1

Id. at 478.
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and still remain true to the principles" of the Founding Fathers. 102 But, the Court stressed,
this "practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of
trying to ajury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts
beyond a reasonable doubt." 10 3
With these principles in mind, the Court proceeded to reject all three arguments
put forward by New Jersey in support of its statute. The state's first argument was that the
hate crime statute's biased purpose penalty was a "traditional sentencing factor" and not
an "element" of a separate hate crime offense. 10 4 To the Court, characterizing "biased
purpose" as just a sentencing factor regarding motive, greatly undervalued its legal
significance. "By its very terms, this statute mandates an examination of the defendant's
state of mind - a concept known well to the criminal law as the defendant's mens rea."los
And a defendant's intent, or mens rea, "is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a
core criminal offense 'element. '106

-

The state's second argument - McMillan allows a legislature to authorize a judge
to find a traditional sentencing factor on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence
was equally unavailing. The Court read McMillan to frown on a legislature allowing a
judge to significantly increase a defendant's maximum penalty using the preponderance of
the evidence standard.1 0 7 Moreover, it was of no Constitutional consequence to the Court,
that the New Jersey legislature placed the hate crime enhancer within the sentencing
provisions of the state's criminal code. The placement did "not define its character,"
which the Court found resembled an element rather than a sentencing factor.o
The Court used few words to dispatch the state's final argument - that
Almendarez-Torres v. United States extended McMillan's holding to the New Jersey
statute.10 9 To the Court, the two situations were far too different. Almerdarez-Torres

concerned recidivism, which does not relate to the commission of the offense itself. New
Jersey hate crime statute, conversely, "goes precisely to what happened in the
commission of the offense.""' 0
In sum, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""

0 2

1
103
104
105

Id. at 483.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 492.
id.

' Id. at 493.

Id. at 494-95. The Court noted that New Jersey's hate crime statute turned a second-degree offense into a
first-degree offense under the state's criminal code, and therefore subjected defendants to significantly
heightened penalties. Id. at 494. In Apprendi's case, the statute potentially doubled Apprendi's maximum
sentence from 10 years to 20 years - a "differential. . .unquestionably of constitutional significance." Id. at 495.
107

108

Id

at 495-96.

Id. at 496; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that it was
constitutional for Congress to define recidivism, particularly illegal re-entry into the United States after being
deported following an aggravated felony conviction, as a sentencing factor, and not an element of the offense).
"o Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 ("There is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a priorjudgment of
conviction [provided beyond a reasonable doubt] and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser
standard of proof.").
109

".Id at 490.
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Blakely v. Washington

Four years later, the Supreme Court used Apprendi to invalidate another state's
use of sentencing factors to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.113 In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving
domestic violence and use of a firearm stemming from a violent episode involving his
estranged wife. Under Washington state law at the time, second degree kidnapping was a
class B felony with a 10-year imprisonment limit. 114 Another state law limited the
punishment for second degree kidnapping with a firearm to a range of 49 to 53 months
imprisonment, unless a judge found compelling and exceptional reasons to impose a
115
sentence exceeding the range.
During the sentencing hearing, Blakely's wife recounted the graphic details of
the kidnapping. 116 Having found that Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty", the judge
rejected the state's recommendation for a sentence within the 49 to 53 month range, and
instead imposed a sentence of 90 months (or 37 months beyond the standard
11 7

maximum).

When the case reached the Supreme Court, Washington state argued that there
was no Apprendi violation because the relevant statutory maximum was not 53 months,

but rather the 10-year maximum for class B felonies under state law."" The Supreme
Court rejected the argument head-on, and set a bright-line rule for what constitutes the
"statutory maximum" under Apprendi:

Our precedents make clear, however, that the "statutory
maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant . . . In other words, the
relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a

judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum
he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge
inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow,
the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential
to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 19
The Court then used this bright line rule to find Blakely's 90-month sentence
constitutionally infirm. It was particularly important to the Court that the judge could not
have imposed the 90-month sentence based on the admitted facts in Blakely's guilty
plea. 120 Because the judge needed to find additional facts, beyond those admitted by
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Id. at 301 ("This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed inApprendi . .
114 Id. at 298-300; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.030 (1975), amendedby Leg. Serv. 57-6151, 2d Spec. Sess., at
356 (Wash. 2001).
" The 49 to 53-month range consisted of, under Washington state law, a "standard range" of 13 to 17 months
for second-degree kidnapping and a 36-month firearm enhancement. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
11. Blakely had abducted his wife from their home, bound her with duct tape, forced her at knifepoint into a box
in the bed of his pickup truck, and ordered their 13-year old son to follow the truck in another car under threat of
shooting his wife with a shotgun. Id. at 298. The judge held a three-day bench hearing following Blakely's
objection to the sentence to obtain further testimony about the circumstances of the kidnapping. Id. at 300. The
judge affinned his finding of deliberate cruelty and the 90-month sentence at then end of the hearing. Id. at 301.
117 Id. at 300.
" Id. at 303.
119 Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 304.
113
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Blakely (or found by a jury), to impose the enhanced sentence, the Court held that the 90month sentence ran afoul of the Constitution and Apprendi.

121

After finding the 90-month sentence was invalid, the Court addressed Apprendi's
critics. The Court explained that for "[t]hose who would reject Apprendi," there were two
unsound alternatives. 122 The first alternative "is that the jury need only find whatever facts
the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and that those it labels sentencing
factors - no matter how much they may increase punishment - may be found by the
judge."1 23 The Court quickly deemed it "absurd" to follow this path, because the jury
would cease to "function as [the] circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice," and
judges and the State would have unlimited punishment power.124
The second alternative "is that legislatures may establish legally essential
sentencing factors within limits - limits crossed when, perhaps, the sentencing factor is a
'tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."'l25 The Court's problem with this
alternative was the subjectivity of determining whether a sentencing factor exceeds
constitutional limits and improperly expands the role of the judge.126 This subjectivity, in
the Court's mind, is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's empowerment of the jury
(which reflects the founders' fear of the power of government and judges). 127
The Court then made clear that its decision was not about the constitutionality of
determinate sentencing, but rather "about how it can be implemented in a way that
respects the Sixth Amendment."1 28 In response to critics (such as Justice O'Connor), the
majority felt it was of no consequence that determinate sentencing schemes involve less
judicial fact-finding than indeterminate sentencing schemes. 129 What was important to the
majority was whether determinate sentencing schemes involve more judicialpower than
jury fact-finding, and therefore requiring more diligent protection of Sixth Amendment
trial and jury rights.130
1 31

United States v. Booker

Booker is well known for transforming the Guidelines into a provider of advisory
sentences rather than mandatory ones. What is often lost is that the decision rested on the
Supreme Court extending Apprendi to the Guidelines to find that Booker's enhanced
sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Booker was convicted at trial of possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams
of crack, which triggered a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. 132 Booker's guideline
range was 210 to 262 months imprisonment based on his criminal history and the evidence
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 306.
id
124 Id
at 306-07; see id at 307 ("This would mean, for example, that a judge could sentence a man for
committing murder even if the jury convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it - or
of making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene.").
125 Id
(quoting McMillanv. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
126 Id. at 307-08 ("With too far as the yardstick, it is always possible to
disagree with such judgments and never
to refute them.").
127 Id. at
308.
121

122
123

128

id

129

Id at 308-09.

130

id

131
132

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 227.
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at trial that his conduct involved 92.5 grams of crack.133 At sentencing the trial judge
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker's conduct involved an
additional 556 grams of crack.134 Based on this finding, the Guidelines required Booker to
receive a sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment.135 The trial judge
sentenced Booker to the low-end of the range -- 360 months in prison.136
Booker's appeal presented two questions to the Supreme Court. The first was
"Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence
under the [Guidelines] based on the sentencing judge's determination of fact (other than a
prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant[?]1"l 37 If the
answer was "yes," the second question concerned the proper remedy - whether the
Guidelines as whole had to be scrapped as unconstitutional or could parts of the
Guidelines be excised to save the rest. 138
The Court answered "yes" to the first question. In delivering the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens relied heavily on Apprendi and Blakely to hold that "[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) that leads to a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond all reasonable doubt." 1 39 According to Justice
Stevens, those cases (and other similar cases) made clear that a defendant has a "right to
have a jury find the existence of 'any particular fact' that the law makes essential to his
1 40

punishment."

Nonetheless, the Court resisted rendering the entire Guidelines unconstitutional,
primarily because of all the efforts behind the passage of the SRA. In speaking for the
Court on the second question, Justice Breyer announced the Court's remedy for saving the
Guidelines from constitutional purgatory was to surgically remove the provisions that
rendered the Guidelines mandatory. 141 Justice Breyer explained that this approach, above
all other alternatives, would allow the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants to live in
concert with the determinate sentencing scheme Congress desperately wanted. 142
Alleyne v. United StateS143

While Apprendi and Blakely firmly established the limits of judicial fact-finding
to impose a sentence beyond a statutory maximum, questions remained about the
constitutional limits of judicial fact-finding to increase a defendant's minimum sentence.
Two years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court temporarily settled the questions with its
Harris v. United States decision which held that judges remained free to find facts to set
or increase a mandatory minimum faced by a defendant. 144 Harris's lifespan came to a

Id.
Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 245.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 244.
140 Id. at 32 (quoting Blakely,
542 U.S. at 301)
141 Id. at 245-58.
142 Id. at
258.
143 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
144 536 U.S. 545, 568-69 (2002), overruledbyAlleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151. The Courtblessed the trial court's
finding by preponderance of the evidence that a firearm was brandished during criminal offense for purposes of
imposing enhanced sentence under 18 § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. at 567-68. The Court held that judicial finding of facts
133
134
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screeching halt in 2013 with the Alleyne decision.
Alleyne and an accomplice robbed a store manager on his way to deliver the
store's daily deposits at a local bank. During the robbery, Alleyne's accomplice
approached the manager with a gun. 145 A jury convicted Alleyne of multiple offenses
related to the robbery, including using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), which carries various mandatory minimum penalties
based on how the firearm was used during the crime. 146
The jury's verdict form did not indicate that Alleyne or his accomplice
"brandished" the firearm during the robbery. 147 Yet based on the presentence report that
recommended the seven-year "brandishing" penalty for Allyene, and evidence presented
at trial, the trial court imposed the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for
brandishing on the § 924(c) count. 148 The court dismissed Allyene's objection to the
sentence on the ground that under Harris, brandishing was a sentencing factor that the
court could find by a preponderance of the evidence without violating the Constitution. 149
The Supreme Court used Alleyne to re-examine whether Harris was consistent

.

and compatible with Apprendi. The Court concluded that it was not.150 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court started with the principle that the "touchstone for determining
whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact
constitutes an 'element' or 'ingredient' of the charged offense.,"1 5 To the Court, the
failure of Harris to extend this principle to facts increasing a mandatory minimum
sentence was inconsistent with Apprendi's definition of "elements," which "necessarily
1 52
includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor."
As the Court recognized, a fact that sets or increases a mandatory minimum "aggravates
the punishment" just as it does when it increases a statutory maximum. 153 And therefore,
to pass constitutional muster "[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are .
elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." 1 54

After establishing the bright line rule, the Court further explained why Harrishad
to give way to Apprendi. To the Court, Harris violated the principle established by
"common-law and early American practice," and embodied in Apprendi, that facts that
increase the prescribed penalties a defendant faces are elements of the offense. 55 It does
not matter whether the facts increase the floor of the prescribed penalties, as opposed to
the ceiling, because it "is indisputable that a fact triggering a mandatory minimum alters
the prescribed range of sentences to which a criminal defendant is exposed."1 56 What is
key for Sixth Amendment purposes, according to the Court, is that facts that increase or
increase a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence within the statutory range does not violate the Constitution.
Id at 568-69.
145 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.
146 Id. at 2155-56. The statute sets a base minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment; a minimum of7 years
imprisonment if the firearm was "brandished"; and a minimum of 10 years imprisonment if the firearm was
"discharged." 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West 2006).
147 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156.
148 id
149id

150 Id. at 2158 ("Harris was wrongly decided and that it cannot be reconciled with our reasoning inApprendi.").
152

id

153id
154id

55

1

Id. at 2160.

156

id
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trigger a mandatory minimum "aggravate" a defendant's punishment because there is a
"heighten[ed] loss of liberty associated with the crime." 57 Therefore the Harris decision's
attempt to limit Apprendi only to facts increasing a statutory maximum was without sound
legal footing, and the "principle applied in Apprendi applies in equal force to facts
15
increasing the mandatory minimum."s
The Court then disparaged the reasoning in Harris that a judge is constitutionally
permitted to impose a enhanced mandatory minimum if the enhanced sentence is within
the statutory range of the offense of conviction found by a jury (or agreed to pursuant to a
plea agreement).1 59 To the Alleyne Court, "[i]t is no answer to say that a defendant could
have received the same sentence with or without the fact." 6 0 The key inquiry, the Court
explained, is always whether a fact "alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to
aggravate it" and is therefore an element of the offense that must be submitted to the
-161

jury.
WHY THE MAX-MIN QUARTET SPELLS THE END FOR WATTS

Inexplicably, what has been largely lost over the years is that in Watts the
Supreme Court did not address whether the Sixth Amendment posed a barrier to acquitted
conduct sentencing. 1 6 2 Since Watts, many circuits have addressed the issue, and
unfortunately have concluded that acquitted conduct sentencing is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment.163 However, a number of these decisions rest on a misunderstanding
that Watts addressed the Sixth Amendment issue in favor of acquitted conduct sentencing,
164 and others were decided before the max-min quartet was complete. 1 6 5
Whatever the
circumstances or reasoning, these decisions must be re-examined in the full light of the
max-min quartet.166

To understand how and why the max-min quartet should put an end to acquitted
conduct sentencing, it is best to start with the circumstances where there can be no

...
Id. at 2161; see id. at 2160 ("It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty
affixed to a crime.").
...
Id. at 2160.
59
1 Id. at 2160-63.
..
o Id at 2162.
161 Id. The court noted that its decision did not mean that "any fact that influences judicial discretion must be
found by a jury," nor did it upset the "the broad discretion of judges to select a sentence within the range
authorized by law." Id. at 2163.
162 See, e.g., United Statesv. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 n.4 (2005) ("Watts, in particular, presented avery
narrow question regarding the interaction of the Guidelines with the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . .").
163 See, e.g., United Statesv. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366,
369 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Ashworth, 139 Fed. App'x. 525, 527 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Mercer, 242 Fed. App'x. 932
(4th Cir. 2007) (relying on Watts to reject the
defendant-appellants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge to trial court having used acquitted conduct to
enhance his sentence); United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J. dissenting)
("The majority's reliance on Watts as dispositive of Sixth Amendment issues is misplaced. Watts neither
considered nor decided the [Sixth Amendment] issue currently before us."); see also People v. Rose, 776 N.W.2d
888, 888 n.3 (Mich. 2010) ("Although other courts have recognized that Watts is not controlling on the Sixth
Amendment question, they have nevertheless been influenced by the other courts that erroneously presumed the
contrary.").
16'

See infra note 161.

United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("The underlying premises of Booker
and its predecessors - Jones, Apprendi . .. andBlakely - detract from Watts' continued validity.").
166
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dispute. 167 First, the max-min quartet, specifically Apprendi, is a complete bar to using
acquitted conduct to extend a sentence beyond the statutory maximum of conviction.
Second, the quartet (specifically Blakely) bars a sentencing judge from using acquitted
conduct to extend a statutory maximum. Finally, the quartet, (specifically Alleyne) bars the
use of acquitted conduct to establish or increase a mandatory minimum sentence.

-

What is unresolved is the grey middle: judges using acquitted conduct to extend a
prison sentence within the statutory maximum of the offense of conviction, without regard
to an applicable mandatory minimum. So why does the max-min quartet put an end to
judges using acquitted conduct in this area? The short answer is that the max-min quartet
firmly reinforces bedrock and interdependent principles underneath the Sixth
Amendment's trial rights, and these principles are irreconcilable with allowing a
sentencing judge to transform offense elements rejected (or not found beyond reasonable
doubt) by a jury into sentencing factors that extend a defendant's term of imprisonment
even if the sentence is within statutory limits. These principles are:
1)

The Constitution demands that a jury find a defendant guilty of all
the elements of the crime with which he/she is charged.

2)

The character of a sentencing enhancer defines whether it is an
offense element or a sentencingfactor.

3)

If a sentencing enhancer is an element then it must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the
defendant.

4)

A judge's sentencing authority is derived from, and limited by a
jury's verdict.

5)

The sentencing rangefaced by a defendant is defined by, and limited
to the facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted
by a defendant.

Together, the principles reflect the Supreme Court's intent through the max-min
quartet to protect and embolden the jury's power to not only resolve the question of guilt
or innocence, but also to find the facts essential to punishment. The max-min quartet puts

to rest the belief and practice that a conviction, without specific findings by a jury,
automatically exposes a defendant to enhanced and extended penalties, mandatory
penalties, and extended statutory maximums.
But these principles reflect a more subtle intent that is important for the argument
presented here. The max-min quartet is part of an ongoing process to dismantle the
practice of prosecutors and judges doing an end-run around the Sixth Amendment's
promise that a conviction on jury-found facts must always precede punishment. 168 Without
a conviction, a judge has no power to impose punishment. The max-min quartet reinforces
not only the premise that a judge's sentencing power is dependent on a conviction, but
also that a conviction does not grant a judge cart-blanche sentencing power. In short, the
'' Id. ("Apprendi and its progeny, including Booker, have elevated the role of the jury verdict by circumscribing

a defendant's sentence to the relevant statutory maximum authorizedby a jury; yet the jury's verdict is not
heeded when it specifically withholds authorization.").
'6' Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26 at 280-281 ("[J]udges can find facts that contextualize an offense and
enhance punishment but thejury must first convict the defendant.") (emphasis added).
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clear implication of the max-min quartet is that a "judge violates a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights by making findings of fact that either ignore or countermand those
made by the jury and then relies on these factual findings to enhance a defendant's
sentence."l 69
To look at it another way, it makes no logical or constitutional sense, that the
max-min quartet prohibits a judge from using a fact rejected by a jury to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence, but permits a judge to use a jury rejected fact to impose a
sentence that is multiple times what the defendant would otherwise receive under the
Guidelines if not for that fact. Take for instance the Jones case discussed in the opening of
this article. Certainly the trial judge could not have sentenced the defendants to a crack
mandatory minimum sentence of 5 or 10 years for the acquitted conspiracy count. Yet, the
judge found no barrier to using "facts" underlying the acquitted conspiracy count to bump
the defendants' sentences from between 27 and 71 months imprisonment to between 180
and 225 months imprisonment - sentences well-above the crack mandatory minimums. It
is a paradox that strains all credulity, and more importantly, renders jury acquittals
meaningless.
This illogical paradox is amply reflected in a decision soon after Booker: United
States v. Magallenez. In that case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiring to
distribute methamphetamine. 17 0 On a special verdict interrogatory, the jury attributed
between 50 and 500 grams of methamphetamine to the defendant. 1 71 At sentencing,
however, the trial judge attributed 1200 grams to the defendant and increased his sentence
accordingly under the Guidelines. 172
Relying on Booker (decided after Magallanez had been sentenced), the Tenth
Circuit held it was error for the trial court "to increase Mr. Magallanez's sentence beyond
the maximum authorized by the jury verdict through mandatory application of the
Guidelines to judge-found facts" using the preponderance standard.173 Yet, the circuit
court rejected the defendant's argument that "under Blakely and Booker, the district court
was required to accept the jury's special verdict of drug quantity for purposes of
sentencing, rather than calculating the amount for itself."1 7 4 According to the appellate
court, because of Watts, a sentencing court "maintained the power to consider the broad
context of a defendant's conduct, even when a court's view of the conduct conflicted with
the jury's verdict." 17 5 Therefore, "[a]pplying the logic of Watts to the Guidelines system as
modified by Booker, we conclude that when a district court makes a determination of
sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the now-advisory Guidelines, it is not
bound by jury determinations reached through application of the more onerous reasonable
1 76

doubt standard."

Although it does not involve acquitted conduct, Magallanez reflects the Kafkaesque world that is criminal sentencing jurisprudence under Watts. On one hand the Tenth
Circuit chided the sentencing court for increasing a sentence beyond facts found by a jury

17

United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776 (8th Cir. 2008).
408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 2005).

171

Id. at 676.

169

Id. at 682-83. The court's finding bumped the defendant's offense level from 26 or 30, to level 32. Id. at 682.
This resulted in a sentencing range of 121-151 months, as opposed to 63-78 months under the offense level that
corresponded with the jury's verdict. The court imposed a 121-month sentence. Id.
173 Id. at 685
74
1 Id. at 683.
172

Id. at 684.
.. Id. at 685.
175
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under the then-mandatory-Guideline scheme, but in the same breath said the trial court
was permitted to do the exact same thing under the "advisory" Guidelines. We are now in
a tail-wags-the-dog situation where the force of a jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment
is dictated and limited by the force of the Guidelines, and not the other way around.
This leads to common rebuttal to Sixth Amendment challenges to acquitted
conduct sentencing: that because Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, the Sixth
Amendment is not implicated when a trial judge relies on facts rejected by a jury to select
a sentence within the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction." The simple
response to this argument is that the max-min quartet does not disturb this premise unless
the judicially discovered "fact" is an element of an offense that was not found (or rejected)
by the jury. An element is not stripped of its character, weight, and significance, once a
jury is released following the verdict. In today's advisory-Guidelines era, "all facts are
not equal . . . especially not facts that amount to separate crimes." 17 What differentiates
acquitted conduct facts, and thereby implicates the Sixth Amendment, is that they "are not
facts enhancing the crime of conviction, like the presence of a gun or the vulnerability of a
victim. Rather, they are facts comprising different crimes." 80
A more probing response is that acquitted conduct sentencing turns Booker onto
itself and strips away the Sixth Amendment protections it was supposed to reinforce. 81
The common understanding is that Booker gave judges back some of the sentencing
discretion that had been taken away by the SRA and the Guidelines. What is often lost is
that Booker also provided increased constitutional protections to federal criminal
defendants facing sentencing. 18 2 Through Booker, the Supreme Court erected a Sixth
Amendment wall between defendants and judicial fact-finding at sentencing. This wall
limits a judge's sentencing authority to the "maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty . . . or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 183 The purpose of
this wall is to protect defendants from fait accompli sentences based on fact-finding at
sentencing under a less demanding standard of proof. In other words, "Just because the
jury has authorized a punishment [with a guilty verdict] does not mean that the jury has
authorized any punishment." 18 4 Booker, therefore, restricts the sentencing power of judges
relative to the defendant, as much as it expands judicial power in relation to the
Guidelines.
Acquitted conduct sentencing betrays the former purpose. It is directly counter to
Booker's intent for judges to use acquitted conduct to extend the sentence range
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 ("For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a
defined range, the defendant has no right to ajury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant."); see
also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384-85 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Post-Booker there is no Sixth
Amendment violation when a judge looks at other facts, including acquitted conduct, to select a sentence within
the statutory range).
178 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) ("The dispositive question, we said [inApprendi] 'is one not of
form, but of effect.' If a State makes an increase in an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by ajury beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
179 United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 153 (D. Mass. 2005).
177

180

Id.

Id. at 150-51 ("In a nutshell, this position, that one can consider acquitted conduct because the Guidelines are
now advisory, seems to hark back to the period pre-mandatory Guidelines when there was a clear line between
the trial sphere and the sentencing sphere").
182 Id. at 153 ("The Booker remedy decision made the Guidelines advisory ....
But the principal decision in that
case and those that had foreshadowed it reflected the Court's new concern with the formal procedures for
determinig facts essential to sentencing.").
183 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244..
184 Mercado, 474 F.3d
at 663.
181
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authorized by the Guidelines. It is of no constitutional importance to a defendant that the
Guidelines are "advisory" as opposed to "mandatory" if the trial judge enhances the
defendant's guideline range based on jury rejected "facts" that constitute elements of an
acquitted offense, and then impose a sentence within that enhanced range. The outcome
a sentence longer than sanctioned by the jury - is the same. Under the max-min quartet,
this backdoor sentencing not only implicates the Sixth Amendment, it runs afoul of it.
As one court explained, it is nonsensical for Booker, when it comes to acquitted
conduct, to afford defendants less Sixth Amendment protections under an advisory
Guidelines scheme:
If the Guidelines are mandatory, "what the jury verdict authorized"
means a sentence framed by the facts tried - excluding aggravating
enhancements to that offense and surely excluding aggravating
relevant conduct if those facts did not form part of the jury's
verdict. With advisory Guidelines, when the trial judge is not
required to accept a sentence driven by enhancements or relevant
conduct, "what the jury verdict authorized" means a sentence just
within the statutory maximum.
However, when a count considers acquitted conduct it is
expressly considering facts that the jury verdict not only failed to
authorize, it considers facts of which the jury expressly
disapproved. Nor is it enough to hark back to the idea that they
jury "only decides guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the
judge decides facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence." The
argument is circular: The fair preponderance standard made sense
in the context of fully indeterminate sentencing. It does not make
sense in this hybrid regime where rules still matter, and certain
facts have important, if not dispositive, consequences.18 5
Moreover, to claim that there is no Sixth Amendment violation because Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory is to ignore the "controlling influence" of the
Guidelines. 18 6 The Guidelines remain the "Federal Government's authoritative view of
appropriate sentences for specific crimes,"18 7 and through a series of post-Booker rulings,
the Supreme Court has ensured that the Guidelines remain so. Accordingly, the Guidelines
are the "starting point and the initial benchmark" for all sentence determinations,188 and
failure to properly calculate a defendant's guideline range constitutes procedural error.8 9
And once a defendant's guidelines are calculated, a within-guideline sentence may be
presumed reasonable, and any departure or variance must be explained. 190 Indeed, a judge

185
18.

187
188
189
190

Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 152-53 (footnote omitted).
Peughv. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084-85 (2013).
Id. at 2085.
Gally. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-49 (2007).
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 356-59.
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"varies from a Guidelines sentence at his or her own peril." 191 "And so, in effect, the
Guidelines, with respect to 'acquitted conduct,' remain very much mandatory." 1 92
By slapping an "advisory" sticker on them, Booker did not "deprive the
Guidelines of force as the framework for sentencing." 1 93 Since the Guidelines remain the
dominant sentencing force post-Booker, when ajudge uses facts rejected (or not found) by
a jury to "alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and
do[es] so in a manner that aggravates the punishment," the Sixth Amendment is certainly
implicated. 194 In short, when it comes to the Guidelines, as one court noted, "[w]e cannot
have it both ways: We cannot say that facts found by the judge are only advisory, that as a
result, few procedural protections are necessary and also say that the Guidelines are
critically important."1 95
A related common justification for acquitted conduct sentencing, is that the
practice is consistent with the Sixth Amendment so long as the resulting sentence is within
the statutory maximum of the offense of conviction. In other words, the offense of
conviction is the jury's authorization of a sentence up to or equal to the statutory
maximum based on facts found by the sentencing judge. However, the "jury
authorization" argument rests on the premise that a jury's verdict authorizespunishment.

A not guilty verdict is the most conspicuous expression of a jury's grant (rather
withholding) of sentencing authority. "The fact that a jury has not authorized a particular
punishment is never more clear than when the jury is asked for, and yet specifically
withholds, that authorization." 1 96 Certainly no one would argue that the Sixth Amendment
and other constitutional protections are not barriers to a judge sentencing a defendant who
was acquitted of all charges, just because the judge found the government proved its case
by a preponderance of the evidence. So it is absurd that an acquittal looses the effect of
withholding sentencing authority just because it is in the company of a guilty verdict. 197

The max-min quartet reaffirms the principle that a criminal offense is a collection
of individual elements, and elements are a collection of facts that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Under the quartet, once an element, always an element.19s A not guilty

United Statesv. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2006), vacated and remanded, 271 Fed. App'x.
298 (4th Cir. 2008); See also United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 777 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring)
("[Flederal district court judges are often acting as automatons-mechanically enhancing sentences with 'acquitted
conduct' pursuant to the now 'advisory' Sentencing Guidelines.").
192 Canania, 532 F.3d at 777 (Bright, J., concurring); Rita, 551 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am not
blind to the fact that, as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually
mandatory after our decision in Booker.")
.19
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083.
194 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156-58 (2013). The protection of a defendant's jury right must
"not [be] motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by the need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance."
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005).
195 Amended Sentencing Memo at 22, United States v. Pimental, 236 F. Supp. 2d 99 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 99103 10-NG), aff'd in partandrev'din part, 380 F.3d 575 (1st Cir. 2004).
16 Mercado, 474 F.3d at 664. See also Id. ("In the case of acquitted conduct, the jury has been given the
opportunity to authorize punishment and specifically withheld it.").
197 See id. at 663 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("It makes absolutely no sense to conclude that the Sixth Amendment
is violated whenever facts essential to sentencing have been determined by a judge rather than a jury, and also
conclude that the fruits of the jury's efforts can be ignored with impunity by the judge in sentencing.") (quoting
United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Mass. 2005).
198 Cf Oregonv. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that when ajudge's fact-finding is
essential to the imposed punishment, "[t]hat 'should be the end of the matter."') (quoting Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
191

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/6

22

Outlaw: Giving an Acquittal Its Due: Why a Quartet of Sixth Amendment Cas
GIVING AN ACQUITTAL ITS DUE

2015]

21 1

verdict does not, and cannot, recast an offense element into something less substantial,
which can be found by a sentencing judge, using a lesser standard of proof, to extend a
prison sentence. 199 Such re-labeling, as the Supreme Court forcefully asserted in Booker,
is "irrelevant for constitutional purposes." 2 0 0 And under the quartet, it is of no import
whether the sentence imposed using acquitted conduct facts falls within the range allowed
by statute. All that matters is the jury has not provided authority for such a sentence, and
the acquitted conduct facts expose a defendant to an aggravated prison sentence that he
would otherwise not face.20 1
TURNING THE TIDE - JUSTICE SCALIA THE KEY?

The key to ending acquitted conduct may lie with an unlikely source - Justice
Antonin Scalia. Through his dissent in Jones, Justice Scalia forcefully called on the
Supreme Court to reach a definitive decision on judicial fact-finding during sentencings,
and chided the Court for passing on the opportunity Jones permitted to do so:
We have held that a substantively unreasonable penalty is illegal and
must be set aside. It unavoidably follows that any fact necessary to
prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable - thereby
exposing the defendant to the longer sentence - is an element that
must be either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. It may
not be found by a judge.
For years, however, we have refrained from saying so. . . . the
Courts of Appeal have uniformly taken our continuing silence to
suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise unreasonable
sentences supported by judicial factfinding, so long as they are within
the statutory range. This has gone on long enough.20 2
While the tone is suggestive, Justice Scalia's dissent does not explicitly say
which way he would vote if the issue were properly before the Court. One must remember
203
that Justice Scalia concurred with the majority decision in Watts.
However, a Scalia
dissent a few years prior to the Jones case suggests that the Justice's comfort with
acquitted conduct sentencing has dissipated over time.
In Oregon v. Ice, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment allowed
states, such as Oregon in this instance, to assign to judges, rather than juries, the role of
finding facts needed to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for multiple
offenses. 204 In dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that Apprendi was an uncompromising
barrier to a sentencing scheme where judge-found facts were "'essential to' the
punishment ... imposed." 20 5
No one would ever dispute that a judge's power to punish a defendant facing a one count indictment rests on
the jury returning a guilty verdict. If the jury returns a not guilty verdict, the trial judge would have no authority
to punish the defendant using judge-found facts under a preponderance of evidence standard. It simply defies
logic to believe this power vacuum is filed just because a defendant faces multiple counts.
200 Booker, 543 U.S. at 231. See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605 (2002) ("[T]he characterization of a fact
or circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question 'who decides,' judge
or jury.").
199

201

See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158.

Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 8-9 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See 519 U.S. 148, 158 (1997).
555 U.S. 160 163-64 (2009).
205 Id. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 223).
202

203
204
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Justice Scalia took aim at the majority's effort to limit Apprendi to "only to the
length of a sentence for an individual crime and not to the total sentence for a
defendant." 206 The majority's faulty logic, according to Justice Scalia, was a betrayal to
the "pains" the Supreme Court had taken "to reject artificial limitations upon the facts
subject to the jury-trial guarantee."2 0 7 These efforts "made clear that the guarantee turns
upon the penal consequences attached to the fact, and not to its formal definition as an
element of the crime." 20 8
Together, Justice Scalia's dissents in Oregon and Jones provide cautious
optimism that the Justice is ready to embrace an unambiguous and unyielding rule that the
jury (and only the jury) is permitted to find facts necessary to extend a prison sentence
regardless of the statutory limit. Or, he at least wants the Supreme Court to resolve the
issue once and for all.
If the acquitted conduct sentencing does come before the Supreme Court again,
who would side with Justice Scalia (assuming he is ready to end acquitted conduct
sentencing)? Among the current ranks, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas joined Scalia's
Jones dissent, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined his Oregon dissent. 209
Assuming they all continued to follow Justice Scalia's lead, there would be at least four
votes for ending acquitted conduct sentencing.
One could speculate about which justice could provide the crucial fifth vote.
However, that speculation must be tempered by the reality of the vote to deny review of
the Jones case. Although the denial order did not reveal how the justices voted, since it
takes just four justices to grant review, it seems clear that the six justices that did not join
Scalia's dissent voted for denial. This is not a good sign for those, including this author,
eager to see the Supreme Court put an end to acquitted conduct sentencing.
CONCLUSION

"The Founders were keenly aware, though, that 'the jury right could be lost not
only by gross denial, but by erosion."' 210 Watts was a monumental breach of the Sixth
Amendment, and its erosive effect on defendants' jury rights continues unabated.
Acquitted conduct sentencing devalues to worthlessness the jury's role in measuring
whether the government has met its burden at trial, and empowers and encourages
prosecutors to over-charge knowing that one guilty verdict will supersede any not guilty
verdicts a jury renders. It is practice that indeed is a "jagged scar on our constitutional
complexion."

2 11

For too long, courts have rested on Watts to justify this invidious practice. In
Watts, however, the Supreme Court side-stepped the Sixth Amendment and the barrier it
poses to acquitted conduct sentencing. It is a maneuver that is no longer available now that
the max-min quartet has fortified the line between judge and jury, and re-invigorated the
206 Id
("I cannot understand why we would make such a strange exception to the treasured right of trial by
jury.").
207 id
208 id
209 See Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 8; Ice,
555 U.S. at 173.
210 United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt,
J., dissenting) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S.
at 248 (1999)).
211 United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., concurring).
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role of the Sixth Amendment in sentencing. Armed with the max-min quartet, now is the
time for a direct Sixth Amendment assault on acquitted conduct sentencing "in order to
again ensure that the 'right of jury trial [will] be preserved, in a meaningful way
guaranteeing that the jury [will] still stand between the individual and the power of the
government."' 212

Brief of Law Professor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Jones, 135 S. Ct. 8 (No. 13-10026)
(quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005)).
212
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